TAX PICKINGS (THE UTILITY OF CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS OF ASSESSEE IN AN ASSESSMENT)

At the time of search, the confessional statement recorded of the assessee cannot be said to be free and independent statements.  Any admission made in ignorance of legal rights or under duress cannot bind the maker of admission and mere admission cannot be bed rock or foundation of an assessment and it is always open to the assessee who made the admission to show that what he admitted was not correct.

The retraction by the Assessee of a statement made under Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act, is permissible when the assessee retracts the statement successfully by adducing sufficient corroborating evidence to show that the said statement was not voluntary and that the admission made therein was incorrect.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Director of Inspection of Income-tax (Investigation) V. Pooran Mal and Sons, [1974] 96 ITR 390 (SC) has held that confession cannot be made foundation of the assessment. In the case of Pullangode Rubber Produce Co. Ltd. V. State of Kerala [1972] CTR (SC) 253: [1973]91 ITR 18 (SC), it was held that an admission in a statement recorded on oath is an extremely important piece of evidence but it cannot be said that it is conclusive and it is always open to the person who made the admission to show that it is incorrect.


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