TAX PICKINGS (RIGHT OF PERSONAL HEARING IN FACELESS ASSESSMENTS)

 Right of Personal Hearing to the Assessee under the Scheme for Faceless Assessments

The relevant part of Section 144B of the IT Act, 1961 which deals with Assessee's right to personal hearing during faceless assessments is reproduced as follows- 

‘144B. Faceless assessment.-…

(7) For the purpose of faceless assessment .-…

(vii) in a case where a variation is proposed in the draft assessment order or final draft assessment order or revised draft assessment order, and an opportunity is provided to the assessee by serving a notice calling upon him to show cause as to why the assessment should not be completed as per such draft or final draft or revised draft assessment order the assessee or his authorized representative as the case may be may request for personal hearing so as to make his oral submission or present his case before the income-tax authority in any unit:

(viii) the Chief Commissioner or the Director General in charge of the Regional Faceless Assessment Centre, under which the concerned  unit is set up may approve the request for personal hearing referred to in clause (vii) if he is of the opinion that the request is covered by the circumstances  referred to in sub-clause (h) of clause (xii):…

(xii) The Principal Chief Commissioner or the Principal Director General in charge of the National Faceless Assessment Centre shall with the prior approval of the Board lay down the standards procedures and processes for effective functioning of the National Faceless Assessment Centre, Regional Faceless Assessment Centres and the unit set up, in an automated and mechanized environment including format, mode, procedure and processes in respect of the following namely :-…

(h) circumstance in which personal hearing referred to clause (viii) shall be approved:

In Sanjay Aggarwal v. National Faceless Assessment Centre Delhi [2021]436 ITR 180, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held as follows-

"A careful perusal of clause (vii) of  Section 144B (7) would show that liberty has been given to the assessee , if his/her income is varied to seek a personal hearing in the matter. Therefore, the usage of the word may (emphasis supplied) to our minds, cannot absolve the respondent Revenue from the obligation cast upon it to consider the request made for grant of personal hearing. Besides this under sub-clause (h) of section 144B (7) (xii) read with section 144B (7) (viii) the respondent Revenue has been given the power to frame standards, procedures and processes for approving the request made for according personal hearing to an assessee who makes a request qua the same. 

11.5. In several matters we have asked the counsel for the Revenue as to whether any standards procedures and processes have been framed for dealing with such request the response which we have got from the standing counsel including Mr. Chandra is that to the best of their knowledge no such standards procedures as also processes have been framed as yet."

So, it may be stated that under Section 144B(7), an assessee has a limited right to seek personal hearing. It may be noted that personal hearing does not necessarily mean physical hearing, a 'virtual hearing' is also considered to be a personal hearing. 


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