TAX PICKINGS (CERTAIN NUANCES OF SEARCH AND SURVEY UNDER THE INCOME TAX ACT)

"It appears to the court prima facie that there is nothing in either in section 132 or 133A that prohibits the department from surveying an entity exclusive to one location of its operations, whereas it may have credible information for search as regards the operation in another location. 

As rightly pointed out by the Department search is qua a “place’ and not necessarily qua the ‘assessee’. The survey by its very nature could be of the entity and any place from where such entity may operate. It is perfectly possible that while conducting survey and search of the premises of an entity for which an authorization has been issued the department can come across material pertaining to some other person or entity. The provisions like section 153C of the Act deal with such contingencies However, that is not to say that a survey or a search cannot happen in two different premises simultaneously. Further, if search is qua the place the court sees no reason why if there are two entities in one premises there cannot be a common search operation."

-Shiva Cement Ltd. and Ors. vs. Director of Income-Tax (Investigation) and Ors, [2021] 439 ITR 92 (Orissa)

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